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Appellants Chad Barnes and Jane Barnes (the "Barneses"), by and through their attorneys 
of record, Holden, Kidwell, Hahn & Crapo, P .L.L.C., hereby submit Appellants' Brief 
I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This case is about how legal forfeiture of a water right is analyzed and determined. This 
area of Idaho law begs for clarification from this Court as there are few cases on the matter and 
little written material from the Idaho Department of Water Resources ("IDWR") regarding 
forfeiture of a water right. Given the conclusion of the Snake River Basin Adjudication, the 
issue of forfeited water rights is going to be raised with increasing frequency and useful guidance 
from this Court will help lower courts and water users better understand forfeiture, act prudently, 
and engage in the correct forfeiture analysis. 
Here, uncontroverted facts show that an irrigation water right was not used on a portion 
of its authorized place of use for more than five years (the "Jackson Property," more specifically 
defined below). The water right owner ("Bloxham", more specifically defined below) instead 
concentrated water diverted under his water right to irrigate a different portion of his property 
(the "Barnes Property", also more specifically defined below). After Bloxham declared 
bankruptcy, the bankruptcy trustee sold the Jackson Property to defendant/respondent, Kirk 
Jackson ("Jackson") in 2012, while Bloxham-and later, the Barneses--continued irrigating the 
Barnes Property. From the time Jackson bought the Jackson Property, he claims to have begun 
gradually re-irrigating parts of the Jackson Property, claiming to use that portion of Bloxham's 
original water right appurtenant thereto. 
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The Bameses have instituted this action to declare that the water right appurtenant to the 
Jackson Property has been forfeited by: (A) nonuse for more than five years, meaning the failure 
to apply any of the water to beneficial use on the Jackson Property; (B) there are no statutory 
exceptions that extend that five year forfeiture period; and (C) Bloxham, by irrigating the Barnes 
Property continuously, made a claim of right that the Barneses may assert on the forfeited water 
before Jackson resumed any use or, alternatively, this action was instituted before Jackson fully 
resumed his use of the water right, and there are fact issues surrounding how much of Jackson's 
water right has been forfeited. The District Court applied a correct analytical framework, but 
erred in its consideration of "nonuse" and in finding that the Bameses could not assert their 
predecessor-in-interest's claim of right. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
The Bameses instituted this action against Jackson on August 29, 2014, to have the 
District Court declare that Jackson's water right, Water Right No. 29-14032 ("29-14032"), has 
been forfeited and, as a result, that Jackson has no right to divert water from Spring Creek. 
Clerk's Record ("R.") at 7-13. Jackson denied the Barneses' were entitled to any such relief and 
counterclaimed, alleging the Bameses' water right, Water Right No. 29-14115 ("29-14115"), 
was forfeited. R. at 22-26. The Barneses denied that 29-14115 was forfeited. R. at 30-31. 
On January 15, 2016, the Barneses moved for summary judgment. R. at 55. This was 
supported by the Affidavit of Craig V. Bloxham (the "Bloxham Affidavit"). R. at 57-81. 
Originally, the hearing on this motion was scheduled for February 29, 2016. R. at 95. However, 
because Jackson changed counsel and the parties were exploring potential settlement options, the 
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hearing was moved several times, to March 15, 2016, R. at 102; then to April 4, 2016, R. at 105; 
until finally the April 4th hearing was converted to a status conference, R. at 3. Because 
settlement negotiations had been unsuccessful, the District Court entered the Second Order 
Setting Court Trial to get the case back on an adverse litigation schedule. R. at 106-11. 
After engaging in discovery, the Bameses reset the hearing for their outstanding motion 
for summary judgment for October 31, 2016. R. at 118. The Bameses also submitted an 
Amended Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs' Motion/or Summary Judgment, R. at 120-38, 
the Declaration of Roy Calvin Henderson (the "Henderson Declaration"), R. at 139-41, and the 
Affidavit of Robert L. Harris (the "First Harris Affidavit"), R. at 142-236. Jackson objected. R. 
at 242-56. In support of his objection, Jackson submitted the Affidavit of Kirk Jackson in 
Support of Defendant's' [sic] Objection to Plaintiff's Motion/or Summary Judgment (the "First 
Jackson Affidavit"), R. at 257-61, and the Affidavit of Peter M Wells (the "Wells Affidavit"), R. 
at 262-317. After the Bameses' reply, R. at 318-46, the District Court heard argument on 
October 31, 2016. R. at 349. 
On November 17, 2016, the District Court issued its Decision on Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "SJ Decision"). R. at 350-362. The SJ Decision found that, although 
uncontroverted evidence showed that Water Right No. 29-10420 ("29-10420")-the parent right 
from which both 29-14032 and 29-14115 derive-had not used the water on Jackson's property 
between 2004 and 2011, 29-10420 (owned by Craig and Vern Bloxham, together referred to as 
"Bloxham") had been used in full on apart of the authorized place of use (the portion that would 
become that Bameses' property), which prevented the occurrence of any non-use to precipitate 
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forfeiture. R. at 355. Further, the SJ Decision also found that the Barneses could not assert 
Bloxham's claim of right to foreclose Jackson's resumption of use of 29-14032 and, since 
Jackson resumed (some) use of 29-14032 on his property before the Bameses bought their 
property and the water right appurtenant thereto, the Barneses' claim of right also could not 
foreclose Jackson's resumption of use. R. at 358. The SJ Decision partly denied the Barneses' 
motion-instead granting summary judgment as to the Barneses' claims in favor of Jackson-
but granted the Barneses' motion as to Jackson's counterclaim. R. at 361. The District Court 
entered a Judgment dismissing the Barneses' complaint and Jackson's counterclaim with 
prejudice. R. at 363-64. 
On December 1, 2016, the Barneses filed Plaintiffs' Motion for Reconsideration. R. at 
365-67. In their supporting memorandum, the Barneses sought to clarify some errors they 
contend the District Court made in the SJ Decision. R. at 368-88. Specifically, the Barneses 
contended that use or non-use of an agricultural irrigation water right, such as 29-14032 
(separately or as a part of the parent right), is determined by its application to beneficial use on 
the authorized irrigated acres. R. at 371-76; see also R. at 376-80 (regarding the interaction of 
partial forfeiture with the beneficial use of irrigating authorized acres). Further, the Bameses 
explained why they were allowed to assert the claim of right made by their predecessor-in-
interest, Bloxham. R. at 380-84. The Barneses also submitted a second affidavit from their 
counsel, Robert L. Harris. R. at 389-403. Jackson objected, arguing that 29-14032 could not be 
forfeited because there was no evidence showing there was enough water during the relevant 
time period to fully satisfy 29-10420-the common parent right-and that Bloxham (the owner 
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of 29-10420) cannot be a third party to assert a claim of right against 29-14032. R. at 412-15. 
Jackson also submitted another affidavit. R. at 417-19. After the Barneses' reply brief, R. at 
422-31, the District Court held the hearing on the Barneses' motion for reconsideration on 
December 22, 2016. R. at 445. 
At the hearing on December 22, 2016, Jackson's counsel brought up a decision of the 
Snake River Basin Adjudication ("SRBA") known as the Monarch Greenback decision. 
Transcript ("Tr."), p. 88, 11. 11-23. To address this newly introduced persuasive authority, the 
District Court allowed the parties to submit supplemental briefs after the hearing. Tr., p. 100, 1. 
13-p. 101, 1. 12; R. at 446-47; see also R. at 432-440, 441-44, 448-56 (the supplemental briefs). 
On January 25, 2017, the District Court issued its Decision on Motion for 
Reconsideration (the "Reconsideration Decision"). R. at 457-71. The Reconsideration Decision 
reasserted the same holding as had the SJ Decision. R. at 470. Thereafter, the Barneses filed this 
appeal. R. at 472-79. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On March 7, 1990, Bloxham filed a claim of water right with the SRBA. R. at 60, 79-81 
(Bloxham Affidavit, ,r 15 and Exhibit 3, respectively). This water right, administratively denoted 
29-10420 by IDWR, was decreed by the SRBA in a partial decree dated March 22, 2004. See 
Partial Decree Pursuant to IR.C.P. 54(b) for Water Right 29-10420 (available from the IDWR's 
Website at: http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/Docslmages/36ghO 1 .PDF). 
Bloxham originally used 29-10420 to irrigate three parcels he called the "Penrose Place," 
the "lower Wilding Place," and "the [upper] Wilding Place," which were all within the decreed 
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place of use for 29-10420. R. at 58-60. However, Bloxham only irrigated the upper Wilding 
Place once, at "some point between 1993 and 1996." R. at 60 (Bloxham Affidavit, ,r 14). The 
upper Wilding Place "has not been irrigated with Spring Creek water [i.e., with 29-10420] since 
the mid-1990s" and specifically not "between 2004 and 2012," while Bloxham owned the 
property. R. at 60 (Bloxham Affidavit, ,r,r 15-16). This is significant because the upper Wilding 
Place was sold to Jackson on April 26, 2012 (and is referred to herein as the "Jackson Property"). 
R. at 60 (Bloxham Affidavit, ,r 16), 216-17. 
In contrast, Bloxham created an irrigation system for the Penrose Place and the lower 
Wilding Place. R. at 58-60. Bloxham actively used 29-10420 to irrigate these parcels through 
2014. R. at 61 (Bloxham Affidavit, ,r 20). On January 31, 2014, Bloxham sold these parcels to 
the Barneses ( and they are referred to herein as the "Barnes Property"). These properties and the 
shape files for the appurtenant water rights are depicted in Addendum A, attached hereto. 
Craig Bloxham filed Bankruptcy on October 12, 2005. R. at 271 (Wells Affidavit, Ex. 2). 
There was some confusion surrounding Bloxham's interest (and thus, the interest of the 
bankruptcy estate) in the Jackson Property and other property. See R. at 271-72 (Wells Affidavit, 
Ex. 2, ,r 3). Ultimately, the bankruptcy trustee sold the Jackson Property to Jackson on April 26, 
2012. R. at 216-17; see also R. at 206 (Jackson's response to request for admission number 1, 
providing that "Craig Bloxham is not [Jackson's] immediate predecessor-in-interest on his 
property, the Federal Bankruptcy Court is"). 
It is completely uncontroverted that neither Bloxham nor the bankruptcy trustee irrigated 
the Jackson Property at any time between 2004 (when 29-10420 was decreed) and 2011. R. at 
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60 (Bloxham Affidavit, ,r 16). When the Jackson Property was sold to Jackson, Bloxham was still 
using 29-10420 to irrigate the remainder of his property-including the Barnes Property. R. at 
61 (Bloxham Affidavit, ,r 20). In contrast, Jackson's claimed irrigation of the Jackson Property 
was extremely limited. 1 Jackson filed a change of ownership notice2 with the IDWR on May 31, 
2012, which split 29-14032 off from 29-10420. R. at 213. 
From July through September 2012, Jackson asserts he irrigated a grove of saplings using 
a 500 gallon tank four or five times per week for a period of ten to twelve weeks. R. at 132 
(citing R. at 193, 167 (First Harris Affidavit, Ex. C, p. 6; id, Ex. A)). This means that, at most, 
Jackson used 30,000 gallons (or 0.092 acre feet) of water during 2012. R. at 132 (citing R. at 
228 (First Harris Affidavit, Ex. G, p. 5)). 
The next year, from April through July 2013, Jackson claims to have used 29-14032 to 
irrigate ten acres of the Jackson Property. R. at 132 ( citing R. at 194 (First Harris Affidavit, Ex. 
2 
Jackson has made many claims regarding irrigation occurring on the Jackson Property. The Bameses have 
submitted evidence from Bloxham (who, previous to Jackson, owned the Jackson Property and water right 
appurtenant thereto) and Roy Calvin Henderson (a neighbor to the Jackson Property who has lived there for 
over 30 years) demonstrating that the Jackson Property has not been irrigated between 2004 and 2012. R. at 57-
62 (Affidavit of Craig V. Bloxham), 139-40 (Declaration of Roy Calvin Henderson). These issues present 
conflicting issues of fact that, for purposes of summary judgment, must be resolved in Jackson's favor. 
However, one question raised in this appeal is whether the facts (assumed in Jackson's favor) are material to 
preventing the forfeiture of29-14032. 
A processed change of ownership submission to IDWR simply updates IDWR's water right records and is not 
evidence that the water right is valid. The Notice a/Change in Water Right Ownership form requires a copy of 
the conveyance document to be submitted with it, and ownership is updated accordingly. A copy of this form is 
available at http://www.idwr.idaho.gov/files/forms/notice-of-change-of-water-right-ownership.pdf. A 
processed Notice a/Change in Water Right Ownership does not mean the water right subject to the ownership 
change is valid. In fact, the correspondence accompanying the processed Notice of Change in Water Right 
Ownership makes it clear that "[u]pdating the ownership record for a water right does not reconfirm the validity 
of the right. When processing an ownership change notice, the department does not review the history of water 
use to determine if the right has been deliberately abandoned or forfeited through five years or more of non-
use." See, e.g., letter regarding change of ownership for Water Right No. 25-7060, available at 
htn,://www.idwr.idaho.gov/apps/ExtSearch/Docslmages/nOi201 .PDF. 
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C, p. 7)). Further, to the extent any irrigation occurred in 2011, there appears to be some overlap 
between these ten acres and those irrigated acres. R. at 132 (citing R. at 168, 181-82 (First 
Harris Affidavit, Ex. A, pp. 55, 36, 35)). 
As to 2014, Jackson has only provided information that he began irrigating the Jackson 
Property in September 2014. R. at 133 (citing R. at 194 (First Harris Affidavit, Ex. C)). The 
Barneses filed this case on August 29, 2014. R. at 7. Thus, any irrigation (or other events) that 
occurred in 2014 or thereafter are irrelevant to this appeal. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
A. Did the District Court apply an erroneous analysis to the question of forfeiture and partial 
forfeiture of a water right? 
B. Did the District Court err in determining that the application of a water right to beneficial use 
had no bearing on the use or non-use of a water right? 
C. What is "beneficial use" in the context of a water right forfeiture analysis? 
D. Did the District Court err in holding that no portion of an agricultural irrigation water right 
can be forfeited when the water user applies all available water on only a portion of the 
authorized acres? 
E. While "water must be available to satisfy the water right" in order for a water right to be 
forfeited, does this require the actual availability of all the allowed diversion rate described in 
the water right or is it the legal entitlement to use a portion of water that is available? 
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F. Did the District Court err in determining that a water user who has forfeited a portion of his 
water right on certain property cannot, after being alienated from the property, assert a claim 
of right effective to foreclose any effort to resume use of the water right on the property? 
G. In the event of a partial forfeiture, are only the authorized irrigated acres under the water 
right reduced, or is a pro-rated portion of the diversion rate authorized under the water right 
also reduced? 
H. Just as partial forfeiture exists under Idaho law, if a water user only partially resumes use of a 
water right before a claim of right is asserted, is the water user entitled to the full water right 
or only that portion he has resumed use of? 
I. Did the Court err in granting summary judgment on behalf of Kirk Jackson and dismissing 
the Bameses' claim? 
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW. 
When reviewing a summary judgment decision, this Court has explained that it "employs 
the same standard used below." Wyman v. Eck, 161 Idaho 723, __ , 390 P.3d 449, 451 (2017) 
(citingJ-U-B Eng'rs, Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311, 314-15, 193 P.3d 858, 861-
62 (2008)). "The court must grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no 
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of 
law." Idaho R. Civ. P. 56(a). In analyzing summary judgment, "[t]his Court liberally construes 
all disputed facts in favor of the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences and 
conclusions supported by the record in favor of the party opposing the motion." Wyman, 161 
Idaho at __ , 390 P.3d at 451 (quoting J-U-B, 146 Idaho at 314, 193 P.3d at 861)). However, 
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when-as here-"an action will be tried before the court without a jury, the judge is not 
constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing a motion for summary judgment 
but rather the trial judge is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn from 
uncontroverted evidentiary facts." Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 437, 807 P.2d 1272, 
1275 (1991). 
In order to survive summary judgment, the non-moving party must submit more than just 
conclusory assertions in response to a motion for summary judgment. In other words, "[a] mere 
scintilla of evidence or only slight doubt is not sufficient to create a genuine issue of material 
fact." Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz, Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 87, 996 P.2d 303, 306 
(2000). "Instead, the nonmoving party must respond to the summary judgment motion with 
specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Van v. Portneuf Med. Ctr., 147 Idaho 
552, 556, 212 P.3d 982, 986 (2009) (citation omitted). 
IV. ARGUMENT. 
Water right forfeitures are generally disfavored under Idaho law, and thus, "[t]he party 
asserting that a water right has been forfeited by nonuse for a period of five years has the burden 
of proving the forfeiture by clear and convincing evidence." Sagewillow, Inc. v. Idaho Dep't of 
Water Res., 138 Idaho 831, 836, 70 P.3d 669, 674 (2003) (citing Carrington v. Crandall, 65 
Idaho 525, 147 P.2d 1009 (1944)). A three-step analysis is required to determine whether a 
water right has been forfeited: (A) whether there has been five years of non-use of the water 
right, Idaho Code § 42-222(2); (B) whether a statutory exception applies to prevent the 
forfeiture, Idaho Code § 42-223; and (C) whether use of the water right was resumed before a 
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third party asserted a claim of right to the forfeited water, Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 836, 70 P.3d 
at 674 (quoting Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 531-32, 147 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1944)). 
This forfeiture analysis applies identically to both complete forfeiture and partial forfeiture. 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680. 
This case presents a relatively straightforward forfeiture case, but for the factual 
complication created by Bloxham's bankruptcy. While Bloxham's bankruptcy does not affect 
the forfeiture analysis or provide a statutory defense (see Section IV.B. l., infra), it does splinter 
a partial forfeiture of 29-10420 (i.e., a forfeiture of the portion of the water right originally 
appurtenant to the Jackson Property) into what is now a complete forfeiture of29-14032 (i.e., the 
water right now appurtenant to the Jackson Property, descending from an administrative split of 
29-10420). Here, there is no evidence demonstrating that any portion of the water right 
appurtenant to the Jackson Property3 was used to irrigate the Jackson Property between 2004 and 
2011. It was only in 2012 after purchasing the Jackson Property that Jackson alleged he resumed 
irrigation ( an alleged fact that is disputed). However, neither of the two circumstances claimed 
by Jackson provide any basis for applying a statutory exception or defense. And after Jackson 
bought the Jackson Property, Bloxham was a third party who, by using the forfeited water, made 
a claim of right against the water not used on the Jackson Property. In any event, this action, 
filed on August 29, 2014, constitutes a per se claim of right, preventing any resumption of the 
For ease of reference, "29-14032" is generally used throughout this brief to refer to the water right appurtenant 
to the Jackson Property, both before Jackson owned the Jackson Property (when the parent right, 29-10420, 
encompassed the Jackson Property) and after Jackson purchased the Jackson Property and filed a change of 
ownership for that portion of 29-10420 that was then administratively assigned the identifying number 29-
14032. 
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use of29-14032 after that date. 
This Court has correctly stated that issues of water law "are extraordinarily complex" and 
"there are no easy answers." American Falls Reservoir Dist. No. 2 v. Idaho Dep't of Water Res., 
143 Idaho 862, 869, 154 P.3d 433, 440 (2007). Forfeiture is certainly among "those principles 
[that] are more easily stated than applied." Id. Any forfeiture decision is "highly fact driven 
and [will] sometimes have unintended or unfortunate consequences." Id. Here, the District 
Court understood the general framework of the forfeiture analysis, but erred while engaging in 
that analysis. As a result, the District Court must be reversed. 
A. Jackson's water right, 29-14032, has been forfeited because it has not been applied to 
the beneficial use for which it was appropriated for at least five consecutive years. 
Under Idaho law: 
All rights to the use of water acquired under this chapter or otherwise 
shall be lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to 
apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated and when 
any right to the use of water shall be lost through nonuse or forfeiture such 
rights to such water shall revert to the state and be again subject to 
appropriation under this chapter. 
Idaho Code § 42-222(2) (emphasis added). Here, the District Court focused on the less precise 
question of "use" or "nonuse" rather than the application of the water right to the beneficial use 
for which it was appropriated. R. at 355-357. This led the District Court to erroneously 
conclude that the mere diversion of the full rate allowed by the water right by Bloxham-
irrespective of consideration of the water's end beneficial use (or lack of beneficial use}--was 
sufficient to preserve all of the water right from forfeiture. R. at 357. However, the District 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF-PAGE 12 
------ ------- ---
Court's focus on the amount of water diverted pursuant to 29-10420, rather than the application 
of that water to beneficial use on the Jackson Property, was erroneous. 
I. Non-use of a water right means the failure apply the water to the beneficial use for 
which it is appropriated. 
In its SJ Decision, the District Court held that "[f]orfeiture of a water right relates to the 
water right's non-use, not the extent of the right's use, or non-use, within the property that the 
water right is attached to. In essence, forfeiture occurs when the owner does not use his full 
water right." (R. at 355 (footnote citation omitted)). The District Court's holding flies in the 
face of the statutory text of§ 42-222(2) and the principle of partial forfeiture. 
The purpose of a water right is to put water diverted under the water right to an actual 
beneficial use. IDAHO CONST., Art. XV, § 3. Thus, "[t]he appropriation [of water] must be for 
some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest 
ceases to use it for such purpose, the right ceases." Idaho Code § 42-104 (emphasis added). 
Consequently, a water right is "lost and forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to 
apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated." Idaho Code§ 42-222(2). Although 
these statutes do not explicitly provide for partial forfeiture, this Court has unequivocally held 
"that partial forfeiture is provided for by [Idaho Code] § 42-222(2)." State v. Hagerman Water 
Right Owners, Inc., 130 Idaho 727, 735, 947 P.2d 400, 408 (1997). Allowing unused water 
rights to perish after five years of nonuse and then be beneficially used by another is an 
affirmation of the "traditional policy of the state of Idaho, requiring the water resources of this 
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state to be devoted to beneficial use in reasonable amounts through appropriation." Idaho Code 
§ 42-226. 
"Beneficial use is enmeshed in the nature of a water right," United States v. Pioneer Irr. 
Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 113, 157 P.3d 600,607 (2007), and is ''the basis, the measure and the limit" 
of a water right, Id. at 111, 157 P.3d at 605. "In Idaho it is 'a well-settled rule of public policy 
that the right to the use of the public water of the state can only be claimed where it is applied to 
a beneficial use in the manner required by law."' Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 110, 157 P.3d at 604 
(quoting Albrethsen v. Wood River Land Co., 40 Idaho 49, 60,231 P. 418, 422 (1924)). Any 
appropriator of water "must apply the water to a beneficial use in order to have a valid water 
right in Idaho." Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 110, 157 P.3d at 604 (emphasis added). In Pioneer, the 
Idaho Supreme Court made clear that it was the application of water to a beneficial use (the 
irrigation of acres) that creates a valid water right for the irrigator, and that the entity that is 
merely "diverting, storing, and distributing the water" does not have a water right because it is 
not applying water to beneficial use. See Pioneer, 144 Idaho at 111, 157 P.3d at 605. In other 
words, it is the application to beneficial use-not merely the diversion of water, as the District 
Court found significant-that sustains a valid water right. See id. 
For that reason, beneficial use is also enmeshed in the forfeiture analysis. The "doctrine 
of forfeiture is predicated upon a statutory declaration that all rights to use water may be lost 
where an appropriator fails to make beneficial use of the water for a statutory period 
regardless of the intent of the appropriator." Gilbert v. Smith, 97 Idaho 735, 738, 552 P.2d 1220, 
1223 (1976) (citations omitted, emphasis added). This principle also applies to partial forfeiture. 
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See Hagerman Water Right Owners, 130 Idaho at 735, 947 P.2d at 408. Thus, partial forfeiture 
of a water occurs "if beneficial use is reduced for the statutory period." R. at 396 (part of an 
"Administrator's Memorandum," dated March 5, 2012, from IDWR Director relating to 
forfeiture) ( emphasis added). 
Because of the failure to put water diverted pursuant to a water right to the decreed 
beneficial use, the District Court's focus on the diversion of water only and its corresponding 
disregard for beneficial use of the water conflated the forfeiture analysis. This Court has 
explained that "[i]f a water user cannot apply a portion of a water right to beneficial use during 
any part of the statutory period, ... a [partial] forfeiture has taken place." Hagerman, 130 Idaho 
at 735, 947 P.2d at 408. In contrast, the District Court concluded that because "Bloxham never 
indicated any instance where he did not use his full amount, or in the least, the full amount 
available to him" he "did not forfeit any of his water right and the five year statutory period was 
never satisfied." R. at 355-357. On reconsideration, the District Court explained that "because 
the [District] Court found that the statutory five year period had not run, a more in depth analysis 
of beneficial use under §42-222 [sic] was unnecessary." R. at 459. The District Court applied an 
erroneous analysis. Water rights are "forfeited by a failure for the term of five (5) years to apply 
it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated." Idaho Code§ 42-222(2). There is no way 
to properly analyze forfeiture under § 42-222 without an in depth analysis of the beneficial use 
(or non-use) of the water diverted under the water right in question. 
2. The measure of beneficial use of an agricultural irrigation water right is the acres 
irrigated thereby and the non-application of 29-14032 (then a portion of 29-10420) to 
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irrigate the Jackson Property for more than five years satisfies the first prong of the 
water right forfeiture analysis. 
"The right to appropriate water is for 'beneficial uses.'" Clear Springs Foods, Inc. v. 
Spackman, 150 Idaho 790, 811, 252 P.3d 71, 92 (2011) (quoting IDAHO CONST., Art XV, § 3). 
Irrigation is one such beneficial use. See, e.g., Mullinix v. Killgore's Salmon River Fruit Co., 158 
Idaho 269, 271, 346 P.3d 286, 288 (2015) (considering the "beneficial use of irrigation"). The 
measure of beneficial use for an agricultural irrigation water right-such as 29-10420,4 29-
14032, and 29-14115-is the number of acres irrigated thereby. Said differently, the only 
beneficial use for an agricultural irrigation right is to irrigate the authorized acres; other elements 
of an irrigation water right-specifically the volume of water and the diversion rate-are derived 
from the number of irrigated acres. Idaho Code § 42-220; see also Idaho Code § 42-202(6). 
The volume of water that may be diverted by an agricultural irrigation water right 
depends on the number of acres to be irrigated. No water user is ever "entitled to the use of more 
water than can be beneficially applied on the lands for the benefit of which such right may have 
been confirmed." Idaho Code § 42-220. "[U]nless it can be shown to the satisfaction of [IDWR] 
in granting such license, and to the [SRBA] court in making such decree, that a greater amount is 
necessary," id, the maximum volume of water that may be used for agricultural irrigation has 
been specified by the IDWR. See R. at 226. Thus, in the area in which 29-14032 (near Downey, 
4 For the sake of completeness, 29-10420 also includes a beneficial use for stockwater. R. at 278. However, 
while under the "PURPOSE AND PERJOD OF USE" heading, 2.24 cfs is for irrigation and 0.03 · cfs is for 
stockwater, the overall "QUANTITY" of 29-10420 is limited to 2.24 cfs and "the quantity of water under this 
right for stockwater use shall not exceed 13,000 gallons per day." R. at 278. This 13,000 gallon per day 
(approximately 0.03 cfs) is in keeping with the so-called "domestic exemption", which includes stockwater for 
livestock. See Idaho Code§ 42-11 l(l)(a). Because the stockwater domestic use of29-10420 has no bearing on 
the analysis, it will not be discussed further. 
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Idaho), the amount of water an irrigation right is entitled to is 3 .5 acre feet per year per acre ( of 
which 2.5 acre feet per year per acre is the consumptive irrigation requirement). R. at 226. This 
volume is reflected in the text of 29-14032. See R. at 232 (specifying that the "Generic Max 
Volume per Acre" is "3.5" acre feet per year). 
Likewise, the diversion rate, which was the District Court's primary consideration in 
evaluating the non-use of 29-14032, R. at 356-57, is derived from the number of irrigated acres 
beginning at the very genesis of a water right. Idaho Code § 42-220; see also Idaho Code § 42-
202(6). When water is first appropriated for agricultural irrigation, the IDWR's field 
examination must yield a report including: 
g. If the water is used for irrigation, the boundaries of the various 
irrigated areas and the location of the project works providing water 
to each shall be platted on the maps submitted with the report and the 
full or partial acreage in each legal subdivision of forty ( 40) acres or 
government lot shall be shown. 
h. Irrigated acreage shall be shown on the field report to the nearest 
whole acre in a legal subdivision except the acreage shall be shown to 
the nearest one-tenth (0.10) acre for permits covering land of less than 
ten (10) acres. 
IDAPA 37.03.02.35.01 (emphasis added). The field examination report's focus on irrigated 
acres for an agricultural irrigation water right determines the duty of water. See IDAP A 
37.03.02.35.03.a. ("For irrigation purposes, the duty of water shall not exceed five (5) acre feet 
of stored water for each acre of land to be irrigated or more than one ( 1) cubic foot per second 
for each fifty (50) acres of land to be irrigated unless it can be shown to the satisfaction of the 
Director that a greater amount is necessary" (emphasis added)). This presumptive diversion 
rate, based on the duty of water relates to "a cardinal principle established by law and the 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF-PAGE 17 
adjudications of this court that the highest and greatest duty of water be required. The law 
allows the appropriator only the amount actually necessary for the useful or beneficial purpose to 
which he applies it." Munn v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 43 Idaho 198,207,252 P. 865 (1926); see 
also Jeffrey C. Fereday et al., WATER LAW HANDBOOK 31-32 (Givens Pursley LLP, September 
1, 2016) (footnotes omitted) (available at: http://www.givenspursley.com/uploads/pdf/water-law-
handbook-9-15-16.pdf, and contained in the record, see R. at 398-403). Thus, the amount of 
acres irrigated under a farm irrigation water right determines a presumed diversion rate (i.e., one 
miner's inch or 0.02 cfs, per acre). This diversion rate is also reflected in the text of 29-14032. 
See R. at 232 (specifying that the "Generic Max Rate per Acre" is "0.02" cfs). 
Here, the District Court incorrectly conducted the "nonuse" portion of the forfeiture 
analysis by conflating "nonuse of a water right" to mean the diversion of less water than is 
allowed by the water right instead of the failure to apply the water right to the beneficial use for 
which it was appropriated. The District Court found that "[a]lthough Bloxham may have 
'forfeited' his land [i.e., the Jackson Property] because he did not water it, the Court looks to the 
water right itself, not the appurtenant land, and by all accounts Bloxham put that (the water right) 
to full and beneficial use." R. at 357. The District Court ultimately held: 
R. at 465. 
Bloxham beneficially used his water right, all that was available to him, at 
all relevant times in question. Where on the subject property he watered is 
not dispositive in this case. . .. Not using water on what would become the 
Jackson [P]roperty is not indicative of non-beneficial use requiring 
forfeiture. Bloxham used his water right period. 
Simply, the District Court got this point wrong. Whether Bloxham diverted all of the 
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water allowed by the 29-10420, the parent right, is immaterial to the question of nonuse. It is the 
"failure for the term of five (5) years to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was 
appropriated" that constitutes nonuse and causes forfeiture. Idaho Code§ 42-222(2). Applying 
more water for irrigation than is necessary is waste, because it is by definition a "use of more 
water than can be beneficially applied." Idaho Code § 42-220. A "water user is not entitled to 
waste water." Hagerman, 130 Idaho at 735, 947 P.2d at 408. Such waste cannot preserve a 
water right from forfeiture. See id. ("a water right holder cannot avoid a partial forfeiture by 
wasting that portion of his or her water right that cannot be put to beneficial use during any part 
of the statutory period. If a water user cannot apply a portion of a water right to beneficial use 
during any part of the statutory period, but must waste the water in order to divert the full 
amount of the water right, a forfeiture has taken place"). Under 29-10420, Bloxham applied 
water to beneficial use on the Barnes Property and did not do so on the Jackson Property. R. at 
60. Allowing Bloxham's concentration of water to preserve the entire water right will subvert 
the decreed and statutory limitations on the volume and diversion rates of water rights 
throughout Idaho. The District Court's interpretation of "nonuse" would render Idaho Code §§ 
42-202(6), 42-220, and IDAPA 37.03.02.35.03.a. merely advisory rather than mandatory. 
Further, the District Court's treatment of 29-14032 reflects an erroneous view of water 
rights that treats them like personal property-i. e., property that can be moved at will within an 
authorized place of use, and even concentrated on any portion thereof, without any impact on the 
whole. A water right is real property. Idaho Code§ 55-101; see also Clear Springs Foods, Inc. 
v. Spackman, 150 Idaho 790,797,252 P.3d 71, 78 (2011). A water right is a "complement of, or 
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one of the appurtenances of, the land or other thing to which, through necessity, said water is 
being applied." Idaho Code§ 42-101. This is a longstanding principle ofldaho water law. See 
Koon v. Empey, 40 Idaho 6, _, 231 P. 1097, 1098 (1924) ("there can be no question that a 
water right becomes appurtenant to the land to which it has been applied and upon which 
the water has been used for irrigation" (emphasis added)).5 Thus, whenever the land is 
conveyed, any water right associated with the land is also conveyed, unless the deed makes 
special mention or deals otherwise with the water right. See Russell v. Irish, 20 Idaho 194, __ , 
118 P. 501,502 (1911). When only part of the property associated with a water right is sold, the 
water right is split proportionately according to the acreage, again unless the deed reserves the 
water right or expressly asserts a different allocation of the split of the water right. Id. ("In the 
first place, it is well established that a water right is an appurtenance to the land on which it has 
been and will pass by conveyance of the land. A division of the land would divide the 
appurtenant water right in the same proportion as it divided the land . .. It had become 
appurtenant to the whole tract, and not to a specific portion thereof, or alone to the 60 acres 
retained by [Russell]" (emphasis added)). For that reason, one way of considering partial 
forfeiture is that the water right has become appurtenant to the land where it is put to beneficial 
use, see Mullinix, 158 Idaho at 277, 346 P.3d at 294 ("Ordinarily water ... become[s] 
5 This has long been the law in other western states as well. See Smith v. Hawkins, 120 Cal. 86, 88, 52, P. 139 
(1898) ("No matter how great in extent the original quantity may have been, an appropriator can hold, as against 
one subsequent in right, only the maximum quantity of water which he shall have devoted to beneficial use at 
sometime within the period by which the right would otherwise be barred for nonuse."); see also Charles B. 
Roe, Jr. and William J. Brooks, Loss of Water Rights - Old Ways and New, 39 Rocky Mtn. Min. L. Inst. 23-1, 
23-11 (1989) (forfeiture statutes serve to "clean up" paper rights so they confirm to what an appropriator is 
actually authorized to put to beneficial use). 
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appurtenant to the land when used upon or in connection with such land" ( quoting Molony v. 
Davis, 40 Idaho 443, 448-49, 233 P. 1000, 1001 (1925), emphasis omitted)), and by failing to put 
the water to beneficial use on certain acres for five years, Idaho Code § 42-222(2), the water 
right appurtenant to those acres is forfeited. Thus, any conveyance of those acres (the water right 
appurtenant to which has been forfeited) will not convey any water rights. See Russell, 20 Idaho 
at __ , 118 P. at 502. 
Regarding the status of a decreed water right in the SRBA, "[ o ]nee a partial decree is 
issued for the water right, the non-user has five years within which to put the water to beneficial 
use before the decreed right is subject to forfeiture. [In other words,] once the decree is issued 
the statutory time period for non-use begins to run anew." In Re SRBA, Case No. 39576, 
Subcase No. 65-056638 (Wood v. Troutt) (Idaho Fifth Judicial Dist. - SRBA, May 2002) (Judge 
Roger S. Burdick) at 21; see also Final Unified Decree, In re SRBA, Case No. 39576 at 12 (Aug. 
26, 2014) (providing that "[t]he time period for determining forfeiture of a partial decree based 
on state law shall be measured from the date of issuance of the partial decree and not from the 
date of [the] Final Unified Decree"). Here, 29-10420 (the parent right of 29-14032) was decreed 
on March 22, 2004. See R. at 231 (under "Decreed Date"). Bloxham averred that other than for 
one year in the mid-1990s, he had not used 29-10420 to irrigate the Jackson Property since that 
time. R. at 60 (Bloxham Affidavit, ,r 16). This failure to irrigate the Jackson Property constitutes 
"a failure ... to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated." Idaho Code § 42-
222(2). Thus, by March 22, 2009, the five-year statutory forfeiture period was satisfied. 
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B. No exceptions or defenses apply to prevent the forfeiture of 29-14032. 
Forfeiture is caused by a five year failure to apply the water right to the beneficial use for 
which it was appropriated, "except that any right to the use of water shall not be lost through 
forfeiture by the failure to apply the water to beneficial use under certain circumstances as 
specified in section 42-223, Idaho Code." Idaho Code § 42-222(2). Idaho Code § 42-223 also 
explicitly provides for other defenses to forfeiture, however, Jackson has never asserted any 
defense outside§ 42-223. 
At the outset of this prong of the forfeiture analysis, it is important to note that, although 
there is little guidance for applying Idaho Code § 42-223, it appears that the statute only applies 
to the five year statutory forfeiture period of § 42-222(2). Idaho Code § 42-223 describes its 
own application thusly: 
A right to the use of water shall not be lost by forfeiture pursuant to the 
provisions of section 42-222, Idaho Code, for a failure to apply the water 
to beneficial use under the conditions specified in any subsection of this 
section. 
Idaho Code§ 42-223. Thus, if the "failure to apply the water to beneficial use" for five years is 
caused by any of the "conditions specified in any subsection of' § 42-223, the water user has a 
viable defense to forfeiture. Id. 
Here, the five consecutive years of nonuse were completed in 2009. Jackson has never 
offered any evidence relating to any time prior to 2011, as Jackson only became aware of the 
Jackson Property in 2011. Thus, none of the issues raised by Jackson in this regard can utilize 
any defense in§ 42-223 to prevent the forfeiture of29-I4032. 
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However, even considered on their merits, Jackson's previously-raised arguments 
asserting various defenses to forfeiture must all fail. In this respect, the District Court was 
correct. R. at 468 (finding that "a defense [Idaho Code § 42-223(6)] was raised, but not found 
valid by the [District] Court"). But, given the standard of review, the Barneses address Jackson's 
claimed defense-and all of the factual circumstances asserted by Jackson--below. The only 
basis ever asserted by Jackson as a defense to forfeiture is a statutory exemption contained in § 
42-223(6). R. at 194. That statute provides: 
No portion of any water right shall be lost or forfeited for nonuse if the 
nonuse results from circumstances over which the water right owner has 
no control. Whether the water right owner has control over nonuse of 
water shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. 
Idaho Code § 42-223(6). Specifically, in discovery, Jackson only asserted two factual bases: 
1. From June of 2006 to April of2012 the property was under the control 
of the United States Bankruptcy Trustee. The water right owner at that 
time, Mr. Bloxham had no ability to control the water and the land to 
which it was to be applied. 
2. After purchasing the property in 2012, Bloxhams prevented Defendant 
from exercising his water right as they told him they would not allow 
him to access the diversion through their property or allow the water to 
be transported through the customary transportation structure for the 
water. Defendant therefore had to make other arrangements for the 
transportation of his water and resumed use of the water in earnest in 
2013. 
R. at 194. Further, it appears that, despite never supplementing his discovery responses-as 
required by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(I)(A}---Jackson has asserted a third factual 
basis for applying§ 42-223(6). 6 This third basis Jackson belatedly asserted is that Bloxham used 
6 Because this Court is considering the Barneses' summary judgment motion under the same standard as the 
District Court, this Court "may exclude the testimony of any witness or the admission of evidence not disclosed 
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all of the water available to him. None of these circumstances warrant application of Idaho Code 
§ 42-223(6) to prevent the forfeiture of29-14032. 
1. The facts and legal conseguences of Bloxham's bankruptcy have no legal impact on 
Jackson's interest in 29-14032. 
At one point, Jackson contended that "[t]his case turns on the murky interrelationship of 
water rights, property transfers, and bankruptcy law." R. at 242. Jackson explained that "any 
interest [Bloxham] had in real property became part of his bankruptcy estate" when he filed for 
bankruptcy on October 12, 2005. R. at 245; see also 11 U.S.C. § 54l(a). However, Jackson also 
explains that "[t]here was a dispute as to who actually owned the property that Jackson would 
eventually purchase from the bankruptcy trustee until 4/12/2012 when Eagle Eyes, Ltd. and the 
Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Trustee entered into an agreement related to who would retain what 
portions of the property." R. at 250 (footnote omitted). The circumstances are further explained 
by Jackson: 
[Bloxham] thought he had transferred any interest he had in the property 
when the property was transferred to Eagle Eyes, Ltd. This may have even 
been his intent. Eagle Eyes, Ltd., and the Bankruptcy Trustee did not sort 
out the ownership of the property until the Stipulation was reached in 
April 2012. 
R. at 250 (footnote 3). Nevertheless, Jackson has asserted multiple arguments relating to 
Bloxham's bankruptcy. Initially, Jackson contended that the issue of control (between Bloxham 
by a supplementation required by [Rule 26)." Idaho R. Civ. P. 26(e)(3). The Barneses requested that Jackson 
"identify which exemptions provided in Idaho Code § 42-223 and common law you claim exempt 29-14032 
from forfeiture." R. at l 94. However, while Jackson provided a supplemental response, R. at 202-07, Jackson 
did not supplement this response to include this third basis for a forfeiture defense. Thus, the Barneses invite 
the Court to exclude all the evidence relating to the third basis Jackson proposes to prevent the forfeiture of 29-
14032. 
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and the bankruptcy trustee) was a circumstance beyond Bloxham's control that prevented the 
irrigation of the Jackson Property. But this argument was rather quickly abandoned, because the 
bankruptcy trustee has control over the bankruptcy estate, 11 U.S.C. § 741-so either Bloxham 
or the trustee had control over both the Jackson Property and the appurtenant water right 
whenever ownership actually passed. Thus, Jackson changed his argument to assert that the 
"bankruptcy automatic stay tolls [the] statutory five year non use, [so] no forfeiture could be 
decreed so long as [ the Jackson] Property was part of the bankruptcy estate." R. at 251 
( emphasis omitted, capitalization omitted). 
This argument is unavailing because, as a matter of law, the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a), does not apply as Jackson has contended. See R. at 326-41 (providing detailed 
arguments regarding the inapplicability of the automatic stay to this situation). First, the 
automatic stay, in relevant part, only bars "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate 
or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 
362(a)(3). This requires an affirmative action to be stayed. H.R. Rep. 95-595, 340-41, 1978 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6297-98. However, the running of time is not an affirmative action, and is 
thus outside the scope of the automatic stay provision cited by Jackson. See In re Pridham, 31 
B.R. 497, 498 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1983); see also Johnson v. First Nat. Bank of Montevideo, 
Minn., 719 F.2d 270,276 (8th Cir. 1983). 
Second, the bankruptcy code's tolling statute, 11 U.S.C. § 108, rather than the automatic 
stay, applies to toll the passage of time. The tolling statute provides: 
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if applicable nonbankruptcy law ... fixes a period within which the debtor 
. . . [may] cure a default, or perform any other similar act, and such period 
has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, the trustee may 
only file, cure, or perform, as the case may be, before the later of-
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period 
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or 
(2) 60 days after the order for relief. 
11 U.S.C. § I08(b). The "order for relief' in this statute is not the final bankruptcy discharge, 
but is "[t]he commencement of a voluntary case under a chapter of [the bankruptcy code]." 11 
U.S.C. § 30l(b). "[W]here one section of the [bankruptcy] Code explicitly governs an issue, 
another section should not be interpreted to cause an irreconcilable conflict." In re Liddle, 75 
B.R. 41, 44 (Bankr. Mont. 1987) ( citation omitted). Because § 108(b) specifically governs this 
topic, that statute, and not the automatic stay, should apply. In re Petersen, 42 B.R. 39, 41 
(Bankr. Or. 1984); see also R. at 335-37 (citing numerous cases, demonstrating that this is the 
majority position adopted by most courts, including the Idaho Bankruptcy Court and the Ninth 
Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel). Here, Bloxham filed bankruptcy on October 12, 2005. R. 
at 184-86. Thus, to whatever extent the Jackson Property (including the portion of 29-10420 
appurtenant thereto) entered the bankruptcy estate before March 22, 2009 (the posited forfeiture 
date), it could only have been tolled, by operation of 11 U.S.C. § 108(b), until May 21, 2009 (60 
days beyond the posited forfeiture date). Jackson has offered no evidence of any resumption by 
even May 21, 2009. 
Third, the bankruptcy code itself excepts the automatic stay from barring "the 
commencement or continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit ... to enforce 
such governmental unit's or organization's police and regulatory power." 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4). 
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To whatever extent forfeiture constitutes an "action or proceeding," the water right forfeiture 
statute falls within this exception. The Ninth Circuit views the satisfaction of either of two tests 
as sufficient to classify a government action as within the scope of§ 362(b)(4). City & County 
of San Francisco v. PG & E Corp., 433 F.3d 1115, 1123-24 (9th Cir. 2006). "Under the 
pecuniary purpose test, the court determines whether the government action relates primarily to 
the protection of the government's pecuniary interest in the debtor's property or to matters of 
safety and welfare." Id at 1124-25 (citation and quotation marks omitted). "If the action 
primarily seeks to protect the government's pecuniary interest, the automatic stay applies. If the 
suit primarily seeks to protect the public safety and welfare, the automatic stay does not apply." 
Id. at 1124. Here, water right forfeiture does not protect Idaho's pecuniary interest, but protects 
public safety and welfare because forfeited "rights to such water shall revert to the state and be 
again subject to appropriation under this chapter." Idaho Code § 42-222(2). In other words, 
Idaho's government gains nothing from the forfeiture, but furthers the purposes of putting water 
to beneficial use. See Idaho Code § 42-104. Likewise, "[u]nder the 'public purpose' test, the 
court determines whether the government seeks to 'effectuate public policy' or to adjudicate 
'private rights."' PG & E Corp., 433 F .3d at 1125 ( citation omitted). "If the primary purpose of 
the suit is to effectuate public policy, then the exception to the automatic stay applies. However, 
a suit does not satisfy the public purpose test if it is brought primarily to advantage discrete and 
identifiable individuals or entities rather than some broader segment of the public." Id (internal 
citation, quotation marks, and brackets omitted). Here, the primary focus of Idaho's water right 
forfeiture statute is to further the public policy of maximizing the beneficial use of water within 
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the state, not to benefit any specific individuals. The forfeited water is again available for 
appropriation by anyone. Idaho Code § 42-222(2). Because Idaho's forfeiture statute satisfies 
both of the Ninth Circuit's tests-even though it must only satisfy one or the other-the 
exception to the automatic stay contained in 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) applies. 
Finally, Jackson's proposed application of the automatic stay to protect 29-14032 would 
impermissibly allow federal law to enlarge or create a substantive property right. "Property 
interests are created and defined by state law. Unless some federal interest requires a different 
result, there is no reason why such interests should be analyzed differently simply because an 
interested party is involved in a bankruptcy proceeding." Butner v. US., 440 U.S. 48, 55, 99 
S.Ct. 914, 918, 59 L.Ed.2d 136 (1979). Thus, "[i]n bankruptcy cases the rights of parties in 
[property] are governed by state laws unless there are contrary provisions in the Bankruptcy 
Code." In re Dulan, 52 B.R. 739, 741 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1985). In Dulan, the court ruled that 
the automatic stay could not extend a time period provided by state law because it was not a 
contrary provision, as that issue of timing was addressed by 11 U.S.C. § 108. Id. Preserving the 
status quo is a goal of the automatic stay, but it is not the touchstone of the entire bankruptcy 
code-as the Eighth Circuit has explained: 
Even accepting the debtor's argument that § 362(a) is designed in part to 
preserve the status quo as of the date of the petition in bankruptcy, their 
right remains only to redeem the property within the period 
established by statute. To hold that§ 362(a) operates as an automatic 
stay of the running of the statutory period of redemption would be to 
enlarge property rights created by state law, a result we view as 
unjustified by the language of § 362(a) and as unintended by 
Congress. 
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Johnson, 719 F.2d at 277 (emphasis added). Idaho law defines a water right and imposes a "use 
it or lose it" principle. Idaho Code § 42-222(2). The automatic stay cannot alter Idaho 
substantive law to enlarge the property interest in a water right. 
2. The 2012 interactions between Jackson and Bloxham-which were admittedly 
negative-have no legal impact on Jackson's interest in 29-14032. 
Jackson's second argument centers on the negative interactions between him and Bloxham 
in 2012 that, Jackson claims, prevented him from accessing his water. However, this argument 
is unpersuasive because the exceptions provided in Idaho Code § 42-223 only relates to the 
"failure to apply the water to beneficial use" and has no bearing on extending, tolling, or 
otherwise protecting the resumption of use of a water right. Idaho Code § 42-223. In other 
words, by 2012, when the alleged interactions occurred, the water right was already "lost by 
forfeiture pursuant to the provisions of section 42-222, Idaho Code, for a failure to apply the 
water to beneficial use" and so the "conditions specific in any subsection of [§ 42-223]" are 
inapplicable. Id. 
However, even on the merits, this argument must fail. By statute, if a landowner refuses 
to allow the passage of a ditch, canal, or conduit, the landowner may choose to exercise the right 
of eminent domain and institute an eminent domain action when denied access to the water 
source of his or her water right. Idaho Code§ 42-1106; see also Telford Lands LLC v. Cain, 154 
Idaho 981, 303 P.3d 1237 (2013) (Upholding action by landowner under eminent domain to 
condemn pipeline easement). Further, to the extent that an open ditch already existed to the 
Jackson property, the easement interest in having the water conveyed through it was appurtenant 
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to the Jackson Property and any interference with that right was actionable at law. In other 
words, Jackson had remedies, easily accessible and readily available, that he chose not to avail 
himself of. Thus, the circumstances could not be beyond his control within the meaning of Idaho 
Code§ 42-223(6) after Jackson has obtained the Jackson Property in 2012. 
3. Water was always legally available (i.e., in priority) to the water right owner for 
application to beneficial use on the Jackson Property, thus its non-use effects a 
forfeiture. 
Jackson has admitted that Bloxham only watered the Barnes Property, and not the 
Jackson Property, but contends that because water is scarce on Spring Creek (the source for 29-
10420 and all water rights deriving therefrom) Bloxham "did like most farmers do when they 
don't have the full water allotment decreed, he used the available water in the location at the time 
where he thought he could get the best use" and because there is no "intent to abandon the water 
on the [Jackson Property]" and "[t]he amount of water that a stream produces is beyond the 
control of the water user," there can be no forfeiture. R. at 250. Intent is immaterial because 
forfeiture under Idaho Code § 42-222(2) is at issue; not abandonment under Idaho Code § 42-
237. Jackson claims to find a basis for the remainder of this argument in Sagewillow, which 
held: 
Water rights are not forfeited because of the failure to use them for a 
period of five years if such failure is caused by circumstances beyond the 
control of the water right holder. Jenkins v. State, Department of Water 
Resources, 103 Idaho 384, 647 P.2d 1256 (1982). The fourteen surface 
water rights appurtenant to the Knollin and Bird Ranches were later 
priority rights that could only be delivered during high water flows. 
Sagewillow raised the defense below that the evidence did not show water 
was available during the years of nonuse. The Department did not make 
any finding on that issue. Because water rights cannot be forfeited by 
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nonuse if the water was not available and Sagewillow raised that issue, the 
Department must find that water was available for Sagewillow's use 
before it can find that Sagewillow forfeited water rights by nonuse of the 
water. Therefore, on remand the Department can address this issue. 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 843, 70 P.3d at 681; see also R. at 412 (quoting this same passage, 
emphasizing the last two paragraphs). However, Jackson's focus on a viable defense because 
"water was not available" in Sagewillow ignores the stated reason why that water was not 
available there-because the water rights in question "were later priority rights that could only 
be delivered during high water flows." Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 843, 70 P.3d at 681 (emphasis 
added). In other words, the water was unavailable to the forfeited water rights as a matter of law 
because they were junior to other water rights. See id. The facts in this matter are very different. 
There is no basis for Jackson's argument that physical unavailability of water is a basis for 
preventing forfeiture. 
Further, this situation is distinguishable from any unavailability of water in Sagewillow. 
There, water was actually unavailable because the supposedly forfeited water rights were junior 
to other water rights and, thus, were out of priority. Id. Here, 29-14032 and 29-14115 share the 
same priority date because they both descend from the same parent right-29-10420. See R. at 
230 (listing a priority date of "05/19/1920" for 29-14032); compare with R. at 234 (listing a 
priority date of "05/19/1920" for 29-14115). As a result, 29-14032 was entitled7 to 40% of the 
available water in Spring Creek-the proportion of the Jackson Property to the rest of the 
More accurately, Jackson is entitled to 40% of the flows in Spring Creek if all other water rights are calling for water. If the 
other water rights on Spring Creek were not calling for water (because, for example, hay has been swathed on the other 
portions of the authorized place of use and is drying), then Jackson would be entitled to more than 40% of the flows in 
Spring Creek, and perhaps even up to 1000/o of his entitlement. For purposes of this brief, reference to 40% of the water 
presupposes that other rights are calling for their water even though there are times when Jackson would have been entitled 
to more than 400/o of the water in Spring Creek. 
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authorized place of use of 29-14115-as asserted by Jackson. R. at 259 (First Jackson Affidavit, 
1 28, explaining that Jackson "used 40% of the water because [he] own[ s] about 40% of the 
original ground that [29-10420] was decreed to irrigate"). Thus, the amount of the flow in 
Spring Creek-which is the crux of Jackson's argument and a basis for the District Court's SJ 
Decision in favor of Jackson-is irrelevant. Pursuant to the water right appurtenant to the 
Jackson Property (which would be denoted 29-14032), the Jackson Property was always entitled 
to some water; in other words, there was always water available to the Jackson Property (i.e., 
40% of the total flows) and when Bloxham owned the Jackson Property, he made a decision not 
to use it at that location. R. at 355 (where the District Court noted that "Bloxham chose not to 
water the future Jackson [P]roperty" (emphasis added)). Whether there was 1 cfs or 10 cfs in 
Spring Creek, 29-14032 was always entitled to 40% of its flows, up to the full amount of its 
decreed diversion rate. It is beyond contest that if Jackson did not use any water on the Jackson 
Property for the next five years, it would forfeit his water right-regardless of low water levels-
because (as things stand under the District Court's decision) Jackson is entitled to use 40% of the 
Spring Creek flows. Because the partial forfeiture analysis is identical to forfeiture in this 
regard, the result should not be any different before 2012, when Bloxham owned both the 
Jackson Property and the Barnes Property. 
As to any exception or forfeiture defense, there is no genuine issue of fact regarding any 
basis to deny that 29-14032 was forfeited by 2009. The only remaining question is whether 
beneficial use of 29-14032 was resumed before a third party asserted a claim of right. 
C. Beneficial use of 29-14032 was not resumed before other water users made a claim of 
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right on its water. 
Finally, because 29-14032 was forfeited by 2009 and no exception applies, the final 
prong of the forfeiture analysis considers the "resumption-of-use doctrine," which is described as 
an affirmative defense as follows: 
although statutory abandonment did actually occur, the forfeiture is not 
effective if, after the five-year period, the original owner or appropriator 
resumed the use of the water prior to the claim of right by a third party. 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 836, 70 P.3d at 674 (quoting Carrington v. Crandall, 65 Idaho 525, 
531-32, 147 P.2d 1009, 1011 (1944)). Thus, a claim of right is the only event that can foreclose, 
or cut off, a water user's resumption of use. This Court explained that 
A third party has made a claim of right to the water if [ 1] the third party 
has either instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture, or [2] has obtained 
a valid water right authorizing the use of such water with a priority date 
prior to the resumption of use, or [3] has used the water pursuant to an 
existing water right. 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (internal citations omitted). With particular 
reference to the second and third methods of making a claim of right: 
Prior to diversion, the water obviously cannot be identified as being the 
water entitled to be used by any particular appropriator. Whether or not a 
third party has made a claim to the water will usually depend upon 
evidence showing that the water source was overappropriated and, because 
of nonuse of water by the senior appropriator, water was available for use 
and used to fill junior water rights, or by evidence showing that 
resumption of use by the senior appropriator would diminish the quantity 
of water being used by junior appropriators from an interconnected water 
source. 
Id. at 842, n. 3, 70 P.3d at 680, n. 3. Further, the resumption can be made by a successor in 
interest to the original appropriator. Id. at 839, 70 P.3d at 677. Because forfeiture is effectuated 
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by a failure to put the water right to beneficial use for five consecutive years, any claimed 
resumption must put the water right to beneficial use "upon the land to which the water right is 
appurtenant." See id. at 842, 70 P.3d at 680; see also I.C. § 42-222(2). 
A claim of right does not complete a forfeiture, but rather forecloses the efficacy of any 
resumption of use. Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 837, 70 P.3d at 675 ("although statutory 
abandonment did actually occur, the forfeiture is not effective if, after the five-year period, the 
original owner or appropriator resumed the use of the water prior to the claim of right by a third 
party" (citation and quotation marks omitted, emphasis added)). The only time-frame involved in 
resumption of use is the already-elapsed five year timeframe during which nonuse has occurred. 
Idaho Code § 42-222(2). In contrast, resumption of use and a claim of right are events, not 
timeframes. 
Here, Jackson did not resume use of the water right appurtenant to the Jackson Property 
before Bloxham, a ''third party," had asserted a claim of right to that forfeited water. 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680. There are two events in the record that constitute 
claims of right. After the Jackson Property was alienated8 from Bloxham's ownership, Bloxham 
still continued to irrigate the Barnes Property-immediately becoming a third party asserting a 
claim of right by using all of the water from Spring Creek (which is overappropriated) to irrigate. 
While the sale of the Jackson Property to Jackson on April 26, 2012, provides a definitive date when Bloxham 
no longer owned the Jackson Property, it is important to remember that the Jackson Property did not pass 
directly from Bloxham to Jackson. As Jackson has repeatedly asserted, his immediate predecessor-in-interest to 
the Jackson Property was the bankruptcy trustee of Bloxham's bankruptcy. Harris A.ff, Ex. D, p. 5 (Response 
to Request for Admission No. I). Consequently, at some point-which is not exactly delineated in the record-
the Jackson Property passed from Bloxham's ownership to the bankruptcy trustee's ownership. It is at that 
point in time that Bloxham became a third party relative to the Jackson Property. 
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Additionally, this action itself constitutes a per se claim of right. Jackson disputes the efficacy of 
the first claim of right, but cannot rationally dispute the second (which poses more fact questions 
that were unresolved by the District Court). 
1. The Barneses are entitled to assert the claim of right made against 29-14032 in 2012 
by their predecessor-in-interest, Bloxham. 
A claim of right may be asserted by a ''third party" who "has used the [forfeited] water 
pursuant to an existing water right." Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680. A claim of 
right made by a third party in this way depends on (a) "evidence showing that the water source 
was overappropriated and, because of nonuse of water by the [forfeited] senior appropriator, was 
available for use and used to fill junior water rights" asserting the claim of right; or (b) "evidence 
showing that resumption of use by the senior appropriator would diminish the quantity of water 
being used by junior appropriators [asserting the claim of right] from an interconnected water 
source." Id. at 842, n. 3, 70 P.3d at 680, n. 3. 
A third party is a "person who is not a party to a lawsuit, agreement, or other transaction 
but who is usu[ally] somehow implicated in it; someone other than the principal parties." 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1617 (9th ed. 2009). Sagewil/ow requires that a claim of right be 
made by a "third party." Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680. Once Bloxham no 
longer owned the Jackson Property, he was a third party relative to the Jackson Property and 
could, therefore, assert a claim of right against the water right appurtenant to the Jackson 
Property. There is nothing in Sagewillow that requires the party alleging forfeiture must be the 
same party that has made a claim of right by either the second or third methods. Likewise, there 
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is no privity requirement on the "third party." See Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680. 
The District Court erred in imposing such a requirement and not allowing the Barneses to assert 
Bloxham's claim of right as the Barneses' predecessor-in-interest. R. at 358. Thus, while the 
timing complicates this point, after Bloxham was no longer the owner of the Jackson Property,9 
he was a third party-like any other person who did not own the Jackson Property--capable of 
asserting a claim of right against 29-14032. 
29-14032 and 29-14115 are interconnected because they both came from the same 
"parent" water right before the parent right was split into different portions for the Barnes 
Property and the Jackson Property. Therefore, these water rights have the same elements of use. 
Spring Creek is over-appropriated. R. at 177 (Jackson's deposition testimony at 117:4-19, 
showing that there is not enough water to satisfy all water rights on Springs Creek); see also R. 
at 61 (Bloxham Affidavit, ,r 19, stating that "[t]here is typically not enough water to supply all of 
the water rights on the system" even without Jackson resuming use of 29-14032). It is 
uncontested that the Barneses and other Spring Creek water users will suffer from diminished 
quantities of water if Jackson resumes use of 29-14032. R. at 177 (Jackson's deposition 
testimony at 117:16-19: "Q. So if you stopped irrigating, that water would be used and relied 
9 The District Court found that "Bloxham could not have any kind of third party legal status to his own estate. 
[Thus,] Bloxham cannot claim that he was a third party under Sagewillow to defeat Jackson's resumption of use 
defense." R. at 468. However, it makes no impact on the analysis when Bloxham is considered a ''third party" 
relative to the Jackson Property. The Barneses have contended that Bloxham was alienated from the Jackson 
Property (and thus became a third party) when the bankruptcy trustee received the Jackson Property into the 
bankruptcy estate (which could be considered on or about April 12, 2012, see R. at 250). However, there is 
absolutely no question that Bloxham was a third party relative to the Jackson Property by April 26, 2012 
(when Jackson bought the Jackson Property from the bankruptcy trustee, see R. at 281-83). In either event, the 
impact on the forfeiture analysis is the same. Bloxham, who was continually irrigating the Barnes Property, 
was a third party capable of asserting a claim of right against 29-14032 by April 26, 2012. Jackson did not 
resume any use of29-14032 until after that date. 
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upon by Barnes and other users that have water rights on Spring Creek? A. Yep."); see R. at 60-
61 (Bloxham Affidavit, ,r,r 17-19). 
Because Spring Creek is over-appropriated, any use of the water forfeited by 29-14032 
by a third party water user on Spring Creek after 2009, is a claim of right to the water, barring 
Jackson's resumption of use claim. Such a use was made by Bloxham. Bloxham used 29-
10420, in full, to "actively irrigate[] the property that Chad and Jane Barnes [now] own up until" 
January 31, 2014, when Bloxham sold the Barnes Property to the Barneses. R. at 61 (Bloxham 
Affidavit, ,r 20). Because Spring Creek is overappropriated and any resumption of 29-14032 will 
reduce the water available to other water users on Spring Creek, Bloxham's ongoing irrigation of 
the Barnes Property (from 2004 to 2014) is a claim of use that preempts any portended 
resumption by Jackson. 
As a result, Jackson has not shown the existence of a genuine issue of material fact with 
regard to his resumption of use of 29-14032 because Bloxham has continually irrigated the 
Barnes Property and, when Bloxham became a third party relative to the Jackson Property that 
continual irrigation constituted a claim of right on the overappropriated waters of Spring Creek. 
2. The Barneses made their own claim of right by filing this suit, which limits the 
resumed use of29-14032 to what Jackson beneficially used in 2012 and 2013. 
In the event that the Court, for any reason, does not consider Bloxham to have asserted a 
claim of right against 29-14032, the institution of this action by the Bameses constitutes a per se 
claim of right that prevents any resumption or further resumption of use by Jackson. See 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680. Thus, any resumption of use of 29-14032 after 
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August 29, 2014, when the Bameses' Complaint was filed, is ineffective. R. at 7. Thus, the 
facts of what resumption was accomplished before August 29, 2014, are extremely significant if 
the analysis reaches this point. 
Jackson contended that he "resumed use of water right 29-[14032] prior to the filing of 
Plaintiffs' Complaint." R. at 23 (Answer and Counterclaim,, 3). In his responses to discovery 
requests and deposition testimony, Jackson describes what he contends is the resumption of use 
of29-14032. 
After purchasing the Jackson Property in April 2012, Jackson contends that from July 
through September 2012, he "[h]auled water from source in a 500 gallon tank for saplings." R. 
at 193 (Response to Interrogatory No. 10). Jackson explained that he used the 500 gallon tank 
"once" per instance, "four or five times a week" for a period of "10 or 12" weeks. R. at 167 
(Jackson's deposition testimony at 54:5-24). This amounts, even giving Jackson every 
reasonable inference, to no more than 30,000 gallons (500 gallons x 1 instance x 5 times per 
week x 12 weeks). While this may sound like a great deal of water, in terms of irrigation, this is 
only 0.092 acre feet. R. at 228 (IDWR's Watermaster Handbook, showing that 1 acre-foot of 
water is 325,850 gallons). For perspective, it is worth remembering that each acre of farmland in 
the area of the Jackson Property is entitled to apply 3.5 acre feet of water--or 1,140,475 
gallons-per acre during the irrigation season. R. at 226; see also R. at 232 (the Water Right 
Report for 29-14032 listing the "Generic Max Volume per Acre: 3.5"). Thus, Jackson's 
contended 2012 water usage amounts to just over 3% of what would typically irrigate only one 
acre of farmland. This de minimis amount is not sufficient to resume use of the water right. 
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However, it is important to note that as late as 2013, Jackson had represented to the 
Natural Resources Conservation Service ("NRCS"), a part of the United States Department of 
Agriculture, that he "planned on putting in an orchard" (implying it did not already exist) but 
agreed that the system he was then installing would not "ever be used to water the orchard." R. 
at 210 ( email from NRCS to Jackson). The testimony of Craig Bloxham, a prior owner of the 
property, and Roy Henderson, a neighbor who literally lives across the street from the Jackson 
property and has lived there for approximately thirty (30) years, is that the property was never 
irrigated. R. at 60 (Bloxham Affidavit, ,r 16); see also R. at 140 (Henderson Declaration, ff 5-
7). 
From April through July 2013, Jackson contends he "pumped water to flood irrigate [a] 
wheat crop in [the] center to south area approximate! y 10 acre area." R. at 194 (Response to 
Interrogatory No. 10). 
The final, relevant year of Jackson's contended resumption is 2014, when he claims to 
have "pumped water for fall planting" in September 2014. R. at 194 (Response to Interrogatory 
No. 10). However, this case was filed on August 29, 2014. R. at 7. Thus, the Barnes' 
"instituted proceedings to declare a forfeiture" prior to any claimed resumption of use by Jackson 
in September 2014 or thereafter, which renders any resumption after the institution of this action 
ineffective. Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (citation omitted). 
The Barneses contest Jackson's factual assertions. And, as mentioned, there are many 
factual issues associated with this portion of the forfeiture analysis. This makes only more 
mystifying the District Court's explanation that: "With all of these questions there is noticeably a 
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lack of 'clear and convincing evidence' as required to prove a forfeiture. One might then wonder 
why summary judgment was not simply denied and the case moved to trial. Forfeiture is a legal 
question under Idaho Code §42-222 therefore this Court made a legal determination. The clear 
and convincing standard was not met." R. at 465. However, this Court has recognized partial 
resumption, stating: "a resumption of use of only a portion of a water right prior to a claim of 
right by a third party will only prevent the forfeiture of that portion of the water right." 
Sagewillow, 138 Idaho at 842, 70 P.3d at 680 (citing Zezi v. Lightfoot, 57 Idaho 707, 68 P.2d 50 
( 193 7) ). Thus, if the Court determines that the Barneses Complaint constitutes the first claim of 
right against the water forfeited by 29-14032, there are fact issues surrounding how much of 29-
14032 was resumed before the Complaint was filed-requiring a remand. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
The District Court, despite correctly framing the forfeiture analysis, erred in conducting 
that analysis. The Jackson Property was not irrigated from 2004 through 2011, which is a period 
in excess of the five-year statutory time period. Jackson has not raised a valid statutory or 
common law defense to forfeiture. Finally, Bloxham's continual irrigation of the Barnes 
Property from the overappropriated Spring Creek, after the Jackson Property was sold, 
constitutes a claim of right that bars any of Jackson's efforts to resume use of 29-14032. In the 
alternative, this action constitutes a per se claim of right and fact issues remain surrounding how 
much use of 29-14032 was resumed before the Barneses' Complaint was filed. In any event, the 
District Court's errors have upheld a water right that should have been declared forfeited, to the 
detriment of the Barneses and their efforts to irrigate the Barnes Property. 
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Forfeiture is an area of Idaho water law that has not been frequently addressed. The 
pertinent case law is few and far between. With the conclusion of the Snake River Basin 
Adjudication, forfeiture issues are likely to become increasingly frequent. Idaho water users 
(and ID\VR) require guidance in how to apply the forfeiture analysis. For example, the issue of 
pivot corners--discussed by the District Court, see R. at 356--presents one arena of forfeiture 
that recurrently arises for farmers throughout Idaho. The Barneses ask this Court to engage in 
the full forfeiture analysis to provide guidance, clarify the details of that analysis, and correct the 
errors made by the District Court by reversing the Judgment as to the Barneses' claims and 
entering summary judgment on behalf of the Barneses. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2~ -t! day of June, 2017. 
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ADDENDUMA 
As this matter constitutes a dispute regarding real property-specifically whether the 
water right denoted 29-14032 has been forfeited-the Bameses hereby submit the following map 
in accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 3 5(g), which depicts the land and water right shape 
files of the real property interests at issue. The map is supported by the following evidence in 
the record: 
• See R. at 8 and 23 (the Complaint, alleging ownership of certain property and 
water rights, and the Answer and Counterclaim, admitting those specific 
allegations with some additional clarification); 
• See R. at 216-18 (the Trustee's Deed, including the legal description of the 
Jackson Property, by which Jackson received the Jackson Property); 
• See R. at 230-32 (IDWR's Water Right Report showing the elements (including 
the place of use) of 29-14032); 
• See R. at 304-306 (the Warranty Deed, including the legal description of the 
Barnes Property, by which the Bameses received the Barnes Property); 
• See R. at 234-36 (IDWR's Water Right Report showing the elements (including 
the place of use) of 29-14115); 
• See R. at 57-71 (the Bloxham Affidavit and Exhibit 1 thereto, describing and 
depicting the properties); 
• See R. at 181-82 (exhibits from Jackson's deposition, which he confirmed 
depicted the Jackson Property and marked as described in the deposition); 
• See R. at 267-269 (aerial imagery depicting the place of use of 29-10420 in 2004, 
2006, and 2009); and 
• See R. at 308 (an IDWR pedigree search result, showing that both 29-14032 and 
29-14115 descend from a common parent right, 29-10420). 
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